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Abstract: Interdisciplinarity is one of the most popular buzzwords used in contemporary
knowledge politics. However, at the same time, the term is not well defined. In order to clarify
its meaning, this paper classifies different kinds of interdisciplinarity. The aim is to show
which specific kind of interdisciplinarity is involved in the NSF-NBIC-scenario on conver-
gence technologies. It will be shown that the NBIC-scenario is based on a “realconstructivistic
object-interdisciplinarity” that is the implicit basis for recent NBIC-knowledge politics. This
type of interdisciplinarity will be explicated and contrasted with the research program of the
European Union that widens the circle of convergence (Converging Technologies for the Euro-
pean Knowledge Society/CTEKS; Initiative of the European Commission). It will be shown
that the main difference between the two programs on convergent technologies is object-inter-
disciplinarity on the one hand and problem-oriented-interdisciplinarity on the other hand.
1. Introduction
Since Erich Jantsch’s programmatic talk at a OECD-symposium in 1970 (Jantsch 1972),
“interdisciplinarity” has become a popular term in knowledge politics and technoscientific
rhetoric (Stehr 2001; Stehr 2005). Today, “interdisciplinarity” is everywhere and no-
where—the term has obviously lost its critical-reflexive power of the 1970s and remains
just functionalistic (cp. Euler 1999). Late-modern “knowledge societies” (Böhme/Stehr
1986) seem to demand “interdisciplinarity” for knowledge production and processing, for
competitiveness and customer care; “interdisciplinarity” is highly valued. The NBIC-visio-
naries advertise their approach by referring to “interdisciplinarity”, namely the “integra-
tion” and “convergence” of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and
cognitive science (NBIC) (Roco/Bainbridge 2002). Here, interdisciplinarity should guar-
antee the “synergistic combination of four major ‘NBIC’.” The main question addressed in
this paper is: Should we follow the visionaries and label the NBIC-vision “interdiscipli-
nary”, even if it turns out—as will be shown in this paper—that the vision is based on a
strong metaphysical and techno(onto)logical reductionism that considers mainly technosci-
entific objects and neglects a critical societal reflection and revision?
This question is not easy to address. After more than thirty years of public and scien-
tific debate, it is not clear at all what the popular buzzword “interdisciplinarity” means,
although some clarification has been achieved.1 One main cause for the lack of clarity is
that philosophers and methodologists have remained reluctant to engage with this issue,
even though it is interlaced with the fundamentals of philosophy. However, the aim of this
paper is to demonstrate that a philosophical approach provides helpful guidelines to ana
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lytically disentangle the umbrella term “interdisciplinarity” and to critically clarify the kind
of interdisciplinarity that is involved in the NBIC-scenario.
In the next section I will present some nebulous quotes from the original Roco-Bain-
bridge-report in which buzzwords such as interdisciplinarity, integration, convergence, uni-
fication, and reduction appear (sec. 2). My basic motivation is to provide a clarification. –
Then, by referring to some well-established differences in philosophy of sciences, I will
propose a classification scheme of four different types of interdisciplinarity (sec. 3): inter-
disciplinarity with regard to (a) objects / entities (“ontology”), (b) theories / knowledge
(epistemology), (c) methods / practices (methodology), and further, (d) reflexive problem-
perception / problem-solving. Different philosophical traditions can be related to these dis-
tinguishable meanings. – It will be shown that the NBIC-type can be classified as an ob-
ject-interdisciplinarity that mainly refers to real-constructed (techno-) objects (sec. 4).
Most interesting is here that the NBIC-kind of object-interdisciplinarity is based on strong
metaphysical convictions (related to a belief in the unity of Nature) and  it encompasses an
onto-(techno-)logical reductionism (related to a belief that one can shape the world by
shaping atoms). The identification of technoscientific development on the one hand and
humane and societal progress on the other hand can be traced back to Francis Bacon’s
technological optimism (sec. 5). – Finally, the (techno-) object-interdisciplinarity of the
NBIC-scenario will be compared and contrasted with the problem-oriented interdiscipli-
narity of the European-Commission initiative on converging technologies (CTEKS) (sect.
6). 
Thus, “interdisciplinarity” in the NBIC-scenario is driven by strong, metaphysically
laden, reductionist visions of new (techno-) objects. This kind of interdisciplinarity turns
out to be an excellent example of contemporary knowledge politics (Stehr 2001; Stehr
2005);2 a new field of political activity is emerging in late-modern “knowledge societies”
(Böhme/Stehr 1986), aimed at fostering and regulating the research, development and use
of new “interdisciplinary” technoscientific knowledge. 
2. The NBIC-Scenario and Central Terms of the NBIC-knowledge Politics
The general direction of the U.S.-National Science Foundation (NSF)—to foster and to
fund interdisciplinarity, integration and innovation of diverse engineering sciences—is
comprehensible (Roco/Bainbridge 2002). Engineering sciences appear to be largely a di-
verse patchwork consisting of very different branches such as electrical, mechanical, mate-
rial, civil, environmental, informational, biomechanical and biomedical engineering. Clas-
sical technologies are bounded technologies (Schmidt 2004) which are developed and ap-
plied in specific contexts, e.g. biomedical technologies in the field of medicine or informa-
tion technologies in the context of information processing, management and storage. 
Today, specialization has splintered engineering sciences and no one in any of the
disciplines can master more than a tiny isolated fragment of all the technical problems.
During the last 60 years, efforts have been made to bring together the various parts of sci-
ence-based technologies, e.g., the earlier attempts of cybernetics in the 1940’s, general
systems theory, information theory, micro systems technology. But no overall progress has
been made until now; engineering sciences still remain a patchwork. In fact, the boundaries
between engineering sciences restrict the pace of invention and innovation. 
“The traditional tool kit of engineering methods will be of limited utility in some of the most
important areas of technological convergence.” (Roco/Bainbridge 2002, 11) 
The NSF aims to overcome this apparent limitation by seeking a common technoscientific
fundament underlying (or should underly) all the engineering sciences. Technoscience is a
perfect term that highlights the merging of natural science, engineering sciences and tech
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nology (Latour 1987; Haraway 1995; Nordmann 2004). Such a deeper fundament should
help to transgress the borders between the various engineering sciences and between engi-
neering and natural sciences—and, thus, it should also foster inventions and innovations.
The NBIC-vision can be understood—and this is my interpretation of the NSF-approach
and the Roco-Bainbridge-report (2002)—as a foundational attempt for engineering sci-
ences. In order to highlight the foundational aspect, the NSF-report speaks much about
“enabling technologies” and less about “technologies” themselves. Enabling technologies
are thought to be rooted at a deeper level: enabling technologies are (basic and fundamen-
tal) technologies that enable, create and foster particular technologies in applied branches.
According to the NSF, interdisciplinarity is a necessary condition to develop “ena-
bling technologies”, such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and
cognitive sciences. Interdisciplinarity turns out to be a functional key element in the NBIC-
vision to obtain a combination, convergence and unification of sciences. The NSF explicitly
highlights the need for “Unifying Science and Converging Technologies”; their vision is to
“Improve Human Performance” (Roco/Bainbridge 2002, x). Surprisingly, however, this
vision seems to be rooted in the traditional metaphysical claim of a unity of nature that re-
veals a strong naturalism:
“In the early decades of the 21st century, concentrated efforts can unify science based on the
unity of nature, thereby advancing the combination of nanotechnology, biotechnology, infor-
mation technology, and new technologies based on cognitive sciences.” (ibid., ix; italic by
J.C.S.)   
Although the NSF-Roco-Bainbridge-report does not define “unity of nature”—it just men-
tions a few times the “unified cause-and-effect understanding of the physical world“ (f.i.
ibid., x)—the unity seems to provide a reason why the condition of the possibility of a uni-
fication of science is given and, in addition, why an advancement of technoscience is feasi-
ble. In addition, it is worthwhile to note here that the NSF mainly refers to technologies
and, in particular, the cognitive sciences are framed from the perspective of “new tech-
nologies”. The report prefers to speak about “technologies” and puts less emphasis on
terms such as “research” or “sciences”. The aim is technology; research is the means. 
The NSF-Roco-Bainbridge-report highlights interdisciplinarity as a “synergistic
combination”. 
“The phrase ‘convergent technologies’ refers to the synergistic combination of four major
‘NBIC’ (nano-bio-info-cogno) provinces of science and technology, each of which is currently
progressing at a rapid rate.” (ibid., ix) 
The term “synergetic” is one of the most popular terms in contemporary knowledge poli-
tics. It was coined by the German physicist Hermann Haken in the late 1960s and, since
that time, the term has become tremendously popular. According to Haken, the main prin-
ciple of synergetics is the “enslavement principle”. Due to small differences in initiate con-
ditions caused by natural fluctuations, one mode will become the “master” and “enslaves all
other modes”—as shown by Haken in a LASER. As a consequence, just a few order pa-
rameters are sufficient to describe a complex system. However, “convergent technologies”
in the NBIC-report can mean that one technology enslaves the others.  This is, indeed, the
case. I will proceed one step further, beyond the symmetry of “NBIC (nano-bio-info-cog-
no)”, and concentrate on nanotechnology.3 Nanotechnology seems to be, more or less, the
fundamental basis for the unification of technologies because the abstract nanoscale and the
nanoobjects are where the convergence of the four technologies is supposed to take place: 
“Convergence of diverse technologies is based on material unity at nanoscale and on tech-
nological integration from that scale. The building blocks of matter that are fundamental to
all sciences originate at nanoscale.” (ibid., ix) 
Nanoobjects are at the center of the synergistic unification. Everything seems to converge
into the very small and abstract world of the nanocosmos. Convergence is the pacemaker to
unity; unity is the final point. The final point is the point of total control, the point of Ar
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chimedes. So it is mainly a unity on the level of objects—in other words: it is an “ontologi-
cal” unity with regard to nanoobjects. Convergence means convergence of technosciences
in technology.
The unity and convergence metaphors are linked with catchwords such as “holism”,
as stated by the NSF: 
“Converging of the sciences can initiate a new renaissance, embodying a holistic view of tech-
nology based on transformative tools, the mathematics of complex systems, and unified cause-
and-effect understanding of the physical world from the nanoscale to the planetary scale.”
(ibid., x). 
The traditional metaphysical view of a continuous causality and a causal nexus of nature is
re-newed by the NSF in order to highlight the technoscientifc possibility and the impor-
tance of unification. In addition, the NSF-claim is that it is “possible to develop a predictive
science of society.” (ibid., 22) Interdisciplinarity in this broad sense encompasses natural
and engineering sciences rather than all disciplines. 
“A trend towards unifying knowledge by combining natural sciences, social sciences, and hu-
manities using cause-and-effect explanation has already begun.” (ibid., 13) 
To illustrate this trend, a strange (short) poem is placed in the NSF report:
“If the Cognitive Scientists can think it
the Nano people can build it
the Bio people can implement it, and
the IT people can monitor and control it” (ibid., 13)
Ironically, the IT people would control what the cognitive scientists think. So the naturalis-
tic causal nexus seems to “operate” without the influence of any human agent, like the
Laplacian Demon of the early 19th century. 
It is taken for granted that the NBIC-technologies—if they are fully developed—will
change the world dramatically and move it in a positive direction.
“Converging technologies could achieve a tremendous improvement in human abilities, socie-
tal outcomes, the nation’s productivity, and the quality of life.” (ibid., ix) 
A “new renaissance” and a “next industrial revolution” will emerge and in fact this opti-
mism is at the core of the knowledge politics of the NBIC-advocates. The renaissance was,
indeed, a phase of transition—from the medieval age to modern times; since this period,
scientific-based technological progress has been equated with human and societal progress.
The NBIC-scenario is close to this view developed in the early 17th century. Thus, the vi-
sion of the NBIC-advocates is neither unique nor new; rather, it can be traced back to the
politician and philosopher Francis Bacon and his contemporaries. During Bacon’s time,
science and technology were not perceived ambivalently, partly because the negative side
effects were not yet known. It was an optimistic age: science-based technologies were re-
garded as the pathway towards future.
However, the NBIC-advocates share a common paradigm: In terms of traditional
epistemology, this paradigm is a classical reductionist strategy, although it seems to be a
somewhat neutral reductionism because, indeed, no reduction toward a unified physics is
intended. The NSF criticizes all positions which do not support an overall object oriented
interdisciplinary reductionism (or reductionist interdisciplinarity): 
“Some partisans for independence of biology, psychology, and the social sciences have argued
against ‘reductionism’, asserting that their fields had discovered autonomous truths that should
not be reduced to the laws of other sciences. But such a discipline-centric outlook is self-defea-
ting, because as this report makes clear, through recognizing their connections with each other,
all the sciences can progress more effectively.” (ibid., 13) 
Hence, fundamental converging technologies are conveyed by an interdisciplinary techno-
logical reductionism with regard to the nanoobjects based on the metaphysical unity para-
digm of (the given and constructed) reality. Reduction here means the reduction to objects
(ontological level), not to theories (epistemological level) or methods (methodological
level). Apparently, shaping the “bottom”, or the nanocosmos, implies an intentional shap-
ing of the meso-, macro- and megacosmos—and a linear determinism for the nanocosmos
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to the others. Hence interdisciplinary technological reductionists debase other scales of
acting in the world, such as the meso-, macro- or megacosmos. These scales are not seen as
relevant for a general control of the world.4 
In addition, the NSF-Roco-Bainbridge-report stresses that their understanding of
interdisciplinarity shoukd not to be regarded solely as an organizing principle but rather as
an integration principle. To achieve “convergence”, integration is necessary.
“Convergence means more than simply coordination of projects and groups talking to one an-
other along the way. It is imperative to integrate what is happening.” (ibid., 32) 
This passage highlights the fact that in order to understand the type of interdisciplinarity
intended by the NBIC-report, an approach by the social sciences regarding project organi-
zation, social structures, individual behaviors, personal benefits, and publications and cita-
tions is insufficient. An internal knowledge of the state of the art of natural and engineering
sciences is indispensable as well as a philosophical reflection on the meaning of “interdis-
ciplinarity”, “integration”, “unity” and “reduction”.
However, of course there are other and very different approaches to nanotechnology
and to convergence technologies in the US.5 But the NBIC-initiative was a and is still one
of the most influential kind of knowledge politics in the US. Now, we can summarize the
assumptions of the NBIC-advocates as follows: 1. Metaphysical assumption about the unity
of Nature / technonature. 2. Onto- (techno-) logical assumption about the unique relevance
of nanoobjects in technonature combined with an onto- (techno-) logical reductionism. 3.
Epistemological assumption about cause-and-effect-reductions of everything—one that also
encompasses the social sciences and humanities—combined with a disciplinary scientific
non-reductionism. 4. Methodological assumption about the outstanding importance of
physical methods interlaced with a stress on other intervening, implementing, controlling
and transforming methods. 5. Assumption about purposes, problems and progress in sci-
ence-technology-society (“Baconianism”): human and societal progress is identified with
and reduced to technological progress; the purposes, such as “human enhancement”, are
given and they need not be discussed further (STS-reductionism). 
In the following we further clarify what kind of interdisciplinarity is involved in the
NBIC-scenario. To achieve this we present different meaning of “interdisciplinarity” (sect.
3) and look which type fits (sect. 4). It will be shown that the ontotechnological assump-
tions are the most prominent. 
3. An Analytic Framework for Understanding “Interdisciplinarity”
Let us elaborate on what could be meant by “interdisciplinarity” with regard to the NBIC-
scenario. To do so it is worthwhile to note that, today, nearly all of those who speak about
“interdisciplinarity” in scientific, personal, or public debates pursue certain goals: she or he
does not aim only to describe science; rather, she or he intends to change, to renew and to
re-structure science, and to shape science-based technologies and societies. Normative as-
pects are always involved; interdisciplinarity in this sense does not leave disciplinarity un-
affected and society untouched, although it is not often explicated.6 An implicit societal
theory—how can contemporary society be understood and how should the societal future
be (shaped)—is always present when “interdisciplinarity” appears. Interdisciplinarity is an
eminently political term: a core element of the current knowledge politics. However, a criti-
cal reflection on the way in which NBIC-advocates use the term “interdisciplinarity” should
start with some analytical classification. 
Such an analysis is missing in the debate on “interdisciplinarity”. In addition to what
has been achieved in the field of reflection on interdisciplinarity (e.g., by Chubin/Por-
ter/Rossini/Connolly 1986; Mittelstraß 1987; Thompson Klein 1990; Weingart/Stehr 2000;
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Decker 2001; Schmidt 2002; Schmidt 2003; and others), we propose a classification
framework of different types of interdisciplinarity. A plurality of meanings will be shown
which does not have a unifying semantic core. There is not one (type of) “interdiscipli-
narity” but various.7 Our approach is systematic and analytical and will use of what the
philosophy of science has achieved. The well-established differentiation between ob-
jects/reality (“ontology”), knowledge/theory (“epistemology”), methods/practices (“metho-
dology”), and further, problem-perception/problem-setting provides a helpful framework
for understanding the multi-faceted term “interdisciplinarity”. 
However, it should be admitted that this paper does not unilaterally follow the unity-
advocates, not without explicating what unity could mean. For instance, Julie Thompson
Klein argues that 
“the modern concept of interdisciplinarity has been shaped in [...] major ways, [in particular]
by attempts to retain and, in many cases, reinstall historical ideas of unity.” (Klein 1990, 22)8
“The roots of the concepts lie in a number of ideas that resonate throughout the discourse—
the ideas of a unified science, general knowledge, synthesis, and the integration of
knowledge.” (ibid., 19)
In addition, throughout this paper unity is regarded just as one element. Other, obviously
contrary elements include, for instance, different kinds of non-reductionism and pluralism.
Some interdisciplinarians argue for unity, others for non-reductionism. Thus, interdiscipli-
narity should be regarded as a relational term that carries an unresolvable tension between
unity, plurality and disunity, between reducibility and irreducibility, and between reduc-
tionism, holism and antireductionism. Interdisciplinarity would be meaningless if it just
aimed to reinstall unity and to enable more successful reductions; if this were the case,
physics would be most successful way to practice interdisciplinarity.9– Now, here is my
proposal for a framework of interdisciplinarity:
First object-interdisciplinarity refers to objects and entities (“ontological” type). The his-
torically established functional differentiation into disciplines does not seem to be totally
contingent. It rather mirrors aspects of the structure of “reality” itself. Edmund Husserl,
Nicolai Hartmann, Alfred North Whitehead and others have argued for a structural-layered
concept of reality. Boundaries between the micro-, meso- and macrocosm seem to be evi-
dent. Interdisciplinary objects are thought to be located or constructed within the structure
of reality. That is, they lie on the boundaries between different (micro-, meso-, macro- and
other) cosmos or within border zones between disciplines, for example the brain-mind ob-
ject.10 In order to argue for this position one has to presuppose at least a minimal ontologi-
cal realism concerning real objects, interlaced with a layered concept of reality, and, based
on this, an ontological pluralism/non-reductionism.11 According to this view, the brain-
mind object can neither be reduced to the material brain nor to the mental mind but, per-
haps, to something neutral which is, in turn, why object-interdisciplinarity can be regarded
as a neutral ontology or a neutral monism. Old and ongoing philosophical issues about mo-
nism, dualism, and pluralism emerge in this debate. Here, interdisciplinarity does not
mainly refer to knowledge, methods, or problems, but to an external, human independent
reality. 
The foregoing is, of course, a very strong and speculative concept of interdiscipli-
narity which might be called universal-object interdisciplinarity. Some weaker concepts of
this position—which will becalled partial or realconstructivistic object interdiscipli-
narity—do not claim a timeless existence for interdisciplinary objects on an invariant
global scale. According to this view, boundaries and interdisciplinary objects are created by
the extended use of technologies12 or cognitively constructed by sciences themselves,13 for
instance the hole in the ozone layer.14 The ontological position can be called real-construc-
tivism; however, unfortunately this position is not fully developed in the philosophy of sci-
ence.15 We show, later in this paper, that nanobots and nanofabrics are excellent examples
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for a realconstructivistic ontological interdisciplinarity that is rooted not in a classical real-
ism rather in a Baconian real-constructivism (Bacon 1950; Bacon 1959).
Second theory-interdisciplinarity: The epistemological type of interdisciplinarity focuses on
knowledge, theories, and concepts – and not primarily on objects and reality, or on methods
and practices. Here, we ask whether interdisciplinary theories do exist and how they may be
specified and identified. Can we demarcate interdisciplinary knowledge from disciplinary
knowledge and from non-scientific knowledge? Is there a unique context of justification of
interdisciplinary theories? Do interdisciplinary models, laws, explications, descriptions, and
explanations exist? Possible candidates for theories are meta-theories which can be applied
to describe very different disciplinary objects. According to this view, an interdisciplinary
theory highlights structural similarities between some properties of objects from various
disciplines. Such a theory is not reducible to a disciplinary one—that is, interdisciplinary
theories do not fit in the disciplinary framework. An epistemological non-reductionism,
with regard to disciplinary theories is the most compelling position.
“Structural sciences” such as complex systems theory are prominent examples.
Here, the goal is a cognitive integration and theoretical synthesis of knowledge. Very simi-
lar to complex systems theory are theories such as: self organization theory, dissipative
structures, synergetics, chaos theory, nonlinear dynamics, fractal geometry, catastrophe
theory, etc. Most of these theories were established in the late 1960s and early 1970s, al-
though some foundational work dates back to the late 19th century (Mainzer 1996; Schmidt
2001). Hermann Haken (1980), the founder of synergetics in the 1960s, regards synergetics
as an “interdisciplinary theory of general interactions”.16 In fact, this type of interdiscipli-
narity—which might be characterized by metadisciplinary theories or, at least, by non-dis-
ciplinary abstract knowledge—is not new. Explicitly, it can be found in work from the
1950s. The physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker coined the term
“structural sciences” (Weizsäcker 1974, 22); Weizsäcker writes, structural sciences “study
their objects regardless of disciplinary origin and in abstraction from disciplinary alloca-
tion”. Today, complex systems theory describes process phenomena—such as pattern for-
mation, self organization, critical behavior, bifurcations, phase transitions, structure break-
ing, and catastrophes17—in different disciplinary branches. 
Third method-interdisciplinarity: In addition, a methodological type of interdisciplinarity
can be identified. In general, methodology refers more to knowledge production, the re-
search process, the rule-based action of scientists, and to the languages in use. The central
issue of methodology is how, and by the application of which rules, can we obtain knowl-
edge? (cp. Mittelstraß 2005; Pohl/Hirsch Hadorn 2006) Regarding interdisciplinarity, some
central questions are: do interdisciplinary methods and actions exist? Is there a specific
context of discovery within interdisciplinary projects? However, interdisciplinary method-
ologies are thought not to be reducible to a disciplinary methodology.18 
Bionics (or biomimicry) might be regarded as an example of an interdisciplinary
method (Benyus 2002; Nachtigall 1994). The core of the bionic’s and biomimicry‘s meth-
odology is the exchange between two disciplines: biology and engineering sciences. Bion-
ics claims to be a transfer methodology from biology to engineering sciences, and probably,
what is mostly not admitted, vice versa. The central, popular and, of course, questionable
idea of bionics can be summarized as follows: “learning from Nature” in order to “inspire
technological innovations” and to optimize artifacts and processes (Benyus 2002). Nature
seems to provide tricky ideas, inventions and innovations that can be used to construct
technology.19 However, interdisciplinary translations are based on models. Therefore,
“learning from Nature” means learning from models of Nature. What is called “Nature” is
not a given but is constructed, as Immanuel Kant argued: We have to be aware that Nature
is perceived and cognitively constructed from the perspective of technology; bionics con
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structs models of the biological nature based on the perspective of engineering sciences.
Thus, the transfer method is not a one-way street; a robot, for example, mimics an ant, but
at the same time the ant was investigated and described from a technological perspective.20
– Besides bionics, there are other examples of interdisciplinary methodologies. Very simi-
lar to bionics is econophysics which organizes methodologically a transfer between physics
and finance/economics (Mantegna/Stanley 2000; McCauley 2004). 
Fourth problem-oriented interdisciplinarity: We should add another level that focuses more
on the starting points, the goals, problems and purposes of interdisciplinary research activi-
ties—in other words, the problem framing, problem setting and problem perception type.
Erich Jantsch argues for a “purposive understanding of interdisciplinarity”: an explicit re-
flection and revision of purposes should be regarded as the highest level of interdiscipli-
narity. Jürgen Habermas (1970) draws attention to the interests of the sciences and to the
purposes of research processes. The problem seeing and setting, and the volition or inten-
tion to obtain a certain knowledge precedes both the context of discovery and the context of
justification, i.e. the methods and theories. There is an immanent teleological structure in
the process of knowledge production. 
However, the very first step in scientific inquiry is mostly judged to be an external
contingent factor and, thus, it has been widely ignored by philosophy of science, although
extended work has been done on problems called “wicked problems” (Rittel/Webber 1973;
Norton 2005, 131f/159f).21 This lack of reflection turns out to be a deficit for specifying
this kind of “interdisciplinarity”. And, with regard to the history of interdisciplinarity and
Erich Jantsch’s classical approach in the 1970s, reference to problems and purposes was a
unique qualification for demarcating interdisciplinarity from disciplinarity. Interdisciplinary
problems are somewhat external to disciplines or to sciences: these problems are primarily
societal ones which are mainly due to and defined by society, lay people, politicians, and
stakeholders.22 These problems demand a solution for the societal prospect. Interdisciplina-
rity has a functional side for (in order to organize!) the future progress of scientific-techno-
logical civilization. Excellent examples are sustainability research or technology assess-
ment (Decker 2001). They all refer to, reflect and revise goals and purposes of our devel-
opment. In particular Erich Jantsch has highlighted the “purposive level” of interdiscipli-
narity (Jantsch 1972, 103).23 Problem-oriented interdisciplinarity in this sense is seen as an
instrument to overcome disciplinary limitations from a purposive and goal-setting perspec-
tive in order to secure societal progress. 
Not everyone will agree to all of the above mentioned types of “interdisciplinarity”. Philo-
sophical stances and underlying convictions will determine which of the four types one
might consider as the most important and what other types will just be viewed as inferences
or mere consequences.24 
4. Specifying the Type of Interdisciplinarity in the NBIC-Scenario
However, based on the framework of the four types of interdisciplinarity, we can address
the question about which type is the most present in the NBIC-scenario. It is worthwhile to
note that the NBIC-advocates do not have much to offer with regard to theories and meth-
ods, and they offer only minor elements with regard to problems and purposes (cp.
Schummer 2004). 
Theory: A coherent theory is not the aim of the NBIC-advocates. A patchwork of
models would work well for them, if it provides an efficient basis for action, intervention
and prediction. Theories are not regarded as ends-in-themselves; rather, they are means and
instruments.  Briefly put, technology is the aim, not theory; technological intervention in
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stead of theoretical representing. On the other hand, the NBIC-advocates realize that theo-
retical elements are indispensable. In order to develop enabling technologies we have to
“integrate what is happening.” (Roco/Bainbridge 2002, 32) For enabling technologies
nothing is more practical than an adequate theory. This makes the NBIC-scenario a perfect
example of a technoscience that merges natural sciences, engineering sciences, and tech-
nology. However, the NBIC-advocates do not have a strong understanding of a “theory”,
e.g., their understanding of a theory is not in the sense of a deductive-nomological explana-
tion which is still the aim of the unification project of physics. Thus, it is convincing that
the NBIC-advocates are reluctant and prefer to speak about the integration of knowledge
rather than about a theory of everything. – Although the aim of the NBIC-advocates re-
quires some theories, it is hard to see any common theoretical umbrella or any interdiscipli-
nary theory in the NBIC-scenario—even if we refer to a weak understanding of theory.
Surely, we find progress in regard to theories within the branch of disciplinary (nano-)
physics but rarely in the frame of a theory that could be called “interdisciplinary” (cp.
Schummer 2004).25 
Method: Similar to the lack of a theoretical framework, a common method and a
unified methodology are not the aim of the NBIC-advocates. Methods are regarded as
means to obtain knowledge. What matters most is the efficiency and the effectiveness of
methods, not any process of unification. If unification can help to increase efficiency, it is
highly desired; however, the methods we find in the NBIC-branch are based on advance-
ments in the realm of physics. The first programmatic speech on nanotechnology was given
by the physicist Richard Feynman in 1959 in which he declared that there seems to be
“plenty of room at the bottom”. And the NBIC-technologies are mainly driven by meth-
odological improvements in the area of physics. For the rise of nanotechnology, physical
instruments such as the scanning tunneling microscopy (STM) and the atomic force micro-
scope (AFM) are of major importance. They stem from advanced developments of physics
in the early 1980’s. If the core of the NBIC-scenario is rooted in nanotechnology, then it is
also rooted in physics. Thus, in fact there is more method-disciplinarity than -interdiscipli-
narity. 
Problem: In addition, the NBIC-convergence can hardly be regarded as problem-
oriented—it is rather technoobject-oriented. General goals are formulated such as human
enhancement, basic needs/food of the LDC, and a “new renaissance”. However, problem-
orientation, as the term is used throughout this paper, means to focus on, to frame and to
solve societal problems by explicitly reflecting on goals—and partly by making use of and
developing new technologies. The NBIC-advocates do not explicate or attempt to initiate a
discourse about purposes. However, their purpose seems to be the fascinating technological
development in itself interlaced with the unspecific idea of human enhancement. For in-
stance, the NBIC-advocates do not have broad reservations with regard to military uses. An
improvement of converging technologies for battlefield domination does not seems to be
undesirable. Thus, the NBIC-scenario does not fit into the reflexive concept of problem-
oriented interdisciplinarity (see also the last section of this paper). In order to compensate
the deficit, concepts of technology assessment (as vision assessment) and shaping of tech-
nology have been developed (Grundwald/Grin 2000; Fleischer 2002; Fleischer 2003; cp.
also: Grunwald 2005; Schmid et al. 2006).
Object: Therefore, if our main findings are negative—if there is a lack of theory- and
method-interdisciplinarity within the NBIC-scenario, and very limited, if any at all, prob-
lem-oriented interdisciplinarity—what can be said about object-interdisciplinarity? Ac-
cording to our definition, we have to take two different kinds of object-interdisciplinary
into account. (a) The strong version assumes that the some objects are timelessly located on
boundaries due to the universal layers of reality (universal object-interdisciplinarity). Ac
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cording to this ontological realism, these objects can be called interdisciplinary objects. (b)
A weaker version states that the boundaries have not and do not exist forever (partial or
realconstructivistic object-interdisciplinarity). Boundaries are constructed by the way hu-
mans construct reality. We construct boundaries and construct objects on boundaries—in
short: boundary-objects.
In fact, the “objects” of the NBIC-scenarios are the constructed technologies. They
have not existed before and do not exist independently in Nature, independently of humans,
although they are based on the laws of Nature: e.g., new materials, new products and proc-
esses.  According to the NBIC-advocates, nanoobjects seem to be, more or less, the funda-
mental basis for the convergence of technologies. It is a convergence in objects, not in theo-
ries or methods. The nanoobject is scale where the convergence of the four technologies is
supposed to take place: 
“Convergence of diverse technologies is based on material unity at nanoscale and on tech-
nological integration from that scale. The building blocks of matter that are fundamental to
all sciences.” (Roco/Bainbridge 2002, ix) 
In the very small and realconstructed world of the nanocosmos, everything seems to con-
verge. Here, the nanotechnoscientific objects might be labeled “interdisciplinary”. It is in-
teresting to see how the realconstructed nanoobjects relate to physics. On the one hand,
nanoobjects belong to the domain of physics; they are located on boundaries between the
quanten-microcosmos and the mesocosmos. On the other hand the NBIC-advocates aim to
produce instrumental knowledge about/for enabling technologies and not to obtain true
knowledge of basic research, such as in the old-fashioned physics. Although the boundaries
between physics and engineering sciences are highly disputed, it is worthwhile to stress that
“convergence technology” does not mean a convergence to objects that just belong to the
disciplinary physics but rather a converegence to technoscientific nano-objects—that are
objects for technological purposes. This is the reason why in the NBIC-scenario we do not
have a reduction to disciplinary objects such as objects of physics but a reduction to inter-
disciplinary (realconstructed) objects. In this sense nanoojects are located between physics,
chemistry, biology, and some engineering sciences.26 Here, Richard Feynman, the early
protagonist of nanotechnology, identified that “There is plenty of room at the bottom” for
non-disciplinary nanoobjects.27 
In consequence, a realconstructivistic object-interdisciplinarity turns out to be the
base of the NBIC-scenario—this is not a strong type of interdisciplinarity (cp. Schummer
2004).28 These techno-objects seem to be at the core of the heterogeneous and diverse fields
of the umbrella term “nanotechnology”, including electron-beam and ion-beam fabrication,
molecular-beam epitaxy, nanoimprint lithography, projection electron microscopy, atom-
by-atom manipulation, quantum-effect electronics, semiconductor technology, spintronics
and microelectromechanical systems. Here, interdisciplinary objects are essential parts of
the recent reality or the reality to come (“ontological level”).29 
5. Realconstructivistic Object-Interdisciplinarity: Renewing the Baconian Project
The rhetoric of knowledge politics has always been around; however, today it is put into
practice to its full extent. The realconstructivistic object-interdisciplinarity is not an inven-
tion of the NBIC-advocates. It can be traced back to Francis Bacon and his concept of sci-
ence in the early 17th century. The politician and philosopher Bacon was generally not in-
terested in theories but in changing the world and constructing objects.
Bacon proclaimed that science is an instrument to extend the power of man as far as
possible (see: Bacon 1959; Bacon 1990). Knowledge is power—Bacon might be a key fig-
ure in the history of knowledge politics! Nature should be hunted by sciences like an animal
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in order to unveil her secrets; nature was for man to milk. The main objective is to “master
the things” (Novum Organon I, Aph. 29). Bacon did not wish 
“a history of nature at liberty and in her usual course, when she […] acts of her own accord,
[…] but much rather a history of nature constrained and perplexed, as she is seen when thrust
down from her proper rank and harassed and modeled by the art and contrivance of man.”
(Novum Organon I, Foreword) 
Indeed, this view of nature became dominant in the concept of modern science and it was
put into practice within its experimental and technological framework. In contrast to the
Aristotelian understanding of nature, nothing is given and everything can be technologi-
cally manipulated. Homo Sapiens became Homo Faber, and they further aspires to become
today’s technoscience S@piens. Science-based technological development became identi-
fied with social and human progress (cp. Böhme 1993). This identification was doubted
from the 1960’s until the middle of the 1990’s, but evidently just for this short epoch. In the
late 1990’s technological optimism returned again to science, technology and politics: the
Baconian Project seems to be the leading underlying ethos of scientists and engineers wor-
king in fields of NBIC-convergence. 
The visions of a science-based technological shaping and manipulation of the world
are not new. They are rooted in the history of our culture. In the empiricist tradition David
Hume confirms the Baconian Project: 
“The only immediate utility of all science is to teach us how to control and regulate further
events [in nature].” (Hume 1990, 76)30 
Thus, the NSF-phrase “shaping the world atom by atom” (cp. Nordmann 2003) is not new
in general, but rather it is an extension and a new summit of the Baconian Project that has
been in development since the 17th century.31 Although technology became science-based
in general in the 19th century, the 21st century will probably be the century of the emergence
of fundamental engineering sciences and an overall technoscientific reductionism. In line
with a general technological optimism the physicist Michio Kaku states today: 
“For most of human history, we could only watch, like bystanders, the beautiful dance of Na-
ture. But today, we are on the cusp of an epoch-making transition, from being passive observ-
ers of Nature to being active choreographers of Nature. The Age of Discovery in science is
coming to a close, opening up an Age of Mastery.” (Kaku 1998, 17) 
Nanotechnology is the tip of the Baconian iceberg. But, until today, Bacon’s Project and his
vision has not been realized and put into practice to its full extent. Bacon speaks in favor of
a science-based reductionist “technological foundation”, a fundament for acting and ma-
nipulating the world. The NSF’s phrases resemble Bacon’s words: 
“If we make the correct decisions and investments today, many of these visions could be ad-
dressed within 20 years’ time. Moving forward simultaneously along many of these paths
could achieve an age of innovation and prosperity that would be a turning point in the evolu-
tion of human society” (Roco/Bainbridge 2002, x)
The emergence of the new NBIC-based innovations has renewed the convictions of “Nova
Atlantis” to support not only scientific explorations and “truth” production but (also)
mainly discoveries, inventions, and innovations (see: Bacon 1959; Bacon 1990). Every-
thing seems to be shaped, designed and controlled within the limits of the laws of nature.
However, Bacon dreamed of knowledge politics whereas today this policy field is put into
practice.32 
6. Prospects: NBIC-Scenario versus CTEKS-Initiative of the European-Commission
There is always a choice: the kind of interdisciplinarity can be chosen deliberately. In order
to deepen the analysis of recent NBIC-knowledge politics let us contrast the US-NBIC-
scenario with another prominent initiative.33 In 2004 an expert group of the European
Commission met the challenge of the NBIC-initiative and  developed “a specifically Euro
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pean approach to converging technologies” (Nordmann et al. 2004). The group released in
2004 a report entitled “Converging Technologies – Shaping the Future of European Socie-
ties.” This concept is called “CTEKS—Converging Technologies for the European Knowl-
edge Society”. Obviously, the Europeans do not focus mainly on human enhancement but
on broader aspects of societal innovation. Their aim is, as we will see, to “widen the circles
of convergence”.
Similar to the NBIC-scenario, interdisciplinarity is also highly esteemed by the
CTEKS-advocates. However, the CTEKS-interdisciplinarity seems to be much broader
than the NBIC’s; the concept of CTEKS is problem-orientated rather than object-oriented.
The CTEKS-advocates aim to take many aspects into account, so they speak about “Nano-
Bio-Cogno-Socio-Anthro-Philo-Geo-Eco-Urbo-Orbo-Macro-Micro”. Most important is
that CTEKS intends not just a convergence of technologies or of technosciences but rather: 
“Converging technologies converge towards a common goal [or shared visions].34 CTs al-
ways involve an element of agenda-setting. Because of this, converging technologies are par-
ticularly open to the deliberate inclusion of public and policy concerns. Deliberate agenda-
setting for CTs can therefore be used to advance strategic objectives such as the Lisbon
Agenda.” (Nordmann et al. 2004, 4)
The societal goals, purposes and aims are the focus, in particular the setting of the goals.
According to the CTEKS-advocates the goals for the future of the European technoscien-
tific civilization should be participatory governance. Not only experts but also lay people
should participate in this process.
“CTEKS agenda-setting is not top-down but integrated into the creative technology develop-
ment process. Beginning with scientific interest and technological expertise it works from the
inside out in close collaboration with the social and human sciences and multiple
stakeholders through the proposed WiCC-initiative („Widening the Circles of Conver-
gence“). For the same reason, ethical and social considerations are not external and purely re-
active but through the proposed EuroSpecs process bring awareness to CT research and de-
velopment.” (ibid., 4)
The foregoing is a perfect explication of the problem-oriented interdisciplinarity, strictly in
contrast to all kinds of object-interdisciplinarity: “Widening the Circles [!] of Convergence”
means to reject the metaphysical “unity-of-nature” metaphor of US-NBIC-initiative, its
cause-and-effect-terminology and its reductive (techno-) object orientation, and to take
broader aspects of the “Socio-Anthro-Philo-Geo-Eco ...” into account. Circles is explicitly
formulated pluralistically: many different kinds of convergence are feasible. By widening
the circles the CTEKS-initiative wants to overcome what Segerstrale has severely criti-
cized: “The missing discourse about science and society” (Segerstrale 2000). Ethical con-
siderations in public discourses should serve as guidelines to explicitly (co-) shape the tra-
jectories towards the future and to enable path decisions for reaching the goals. These tra-
jectories should be set and selected in order for them to converge with societal goals, cul-
tural needs, and ethical considerations. By these terms, some of the trajectories of the
NBIC-advocates are criticized and rejected:
„Converging Technologies (CTs) present equally significant opportunities and challenges.“
(ibid., 4) “Agendas for convergence include „Converging technologies for improving human
performance“ or „Converging technologies for battlefield domination.“ The expert group does
not recommend there or any one such agenda. By proposing „Converging technologies for the
European Knowledge Society (CTEKS),“ it places the emphasis on the agenda-setting process
itself. It envisions that various European CT research programs will be formulated, each ad-
dressing a different problem and each bringing together different technologies and technology-
enabling sciences. These might include „CTs for natural language processing,“ „CTs for the
treatment of obesity,“ or „CTs for intelligent dwelling.“ (ibid., 4)
Indeed, this is a broad understanding of convergence linked with a broad understanding of
interdisciplinarity. However, the European expert group offers 16 recommendations, among
them “interdisciplinarity” which is more than an organizational principle:
“Interdisciplinarity should be strengthened, beyond planned or institutional collaboration, in
program calls and research policies from the Commission and from the European nations.”
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(ibid., 4) Further: “CT modules should be introduced at secondary and higher education levels
to synergize disciplinary perspectives and to foster interaction between liberal arts and the sci-
ences.“ (ibid., 5) “Commission and Member States need to recognize and support the contribu-
tions of the social sciences and humanities in relation to CTs, with commitments especially to
evolutionary anthropology, the economics of technological research and development, fore-
sight methodologies and philosophy.“ (ibid., 5)35
So the European CTEKS-advocates are not arguing for a naturalization of social sciences
and humanities; in particular they are very reluctant to speak about a unity of nature, inte-
gration, a unity of science and cause-and-effect-explanations. 
This comparison of the two contrasting visions of Converging Technologies might provide
a further argument that the classification of different types of interdisciplinarity is a helpful
analytic tool to investigate research programs and recent knowledge politics. Realconstruc-
tivistic Object-interdisciplinarity and problem-oriented-interdisciplinarity are very different.
This distinction might serve as a cornerstone for critically assessing the fluid buzzword
“interdisciplinarity” in the various contexts of recent knowledge politics—which raises the
question: Should the object or the problem-oriented type of interdisciplinarity guide the
knowledge politics for our common future?36 
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1 See, f.i.: Ropohl (1981), Mittelstraß (1987), Thompson Klein (1990), Bechmann/Frederichs (1996), Jaeger/Scheringer
(1998), Euler (1999), Weingart/Stehr (2000), Decker (2001), Schmidt (2003), Schmidt (2005) and others.
2 Indeed, the NBIC-visionaries are very successful in their advertising strategy to obtain funding money.
3 It is pretty unclear how to understand and define nanotechnology: see the excellent study of Schmid et al. (2006).
4 The meso-, macro- or megacosmos do not seem to possess own supervenient properties. This is, of course, a strong
claim and reveals the straight naturalistic viewpoint which is based on the (classical) conviction of a continuous cause-
and-effect nexus of the world, especially a naturalistic line from the nanocosm to the macrocosm. The phrase “shaping the
world atom-by-atom” neglects classical engineering sciences on scales of the micro-, meso-, macro- or megacosmos and
just focuses on the nanocosm.
5 It is worthwhile to note that there are also other initiatives with different approaches in the US forstering in particular
“nanotechnology”. Let me just mention some aspects of the NBIC-knowledge politics. – Generally, in November 2003 the
US Senate passed the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, in order to “authorize appropriations
for nanosciences, nanoengineering and nanotechnology research.” – In addition, there existis a Center for Responsible
Nanotechnology (www.crnano.org/) that is a non-profit research and advocacy think tank concerned with “the major
societal and environmental implications of advanced nanotechnology.” It is a networked organization—a collection of
more than 100 volunteers, over 1000 interested followers, and a small team of primary coordinators. – And, the Nano-
ethics Group (www.nanoethics.org/) that is a non-partisan and independent organization focused generally on the ethical
and social implications of nanotechnology. – In particular the project “Creativity capabilities and the promotion of highly
innovative research in Europe and the United States (CREA)” at the Georgia Institute of Technology/Atlanta: Researchers
from the Technology Policy and Assessment Center (TPAC) at Georgia Tech’s School of Public Policy are collaborating
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with two European partners, the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI) and Sussex University’s
Science and Technology Policy Research Unit (SPRU) in a new study to examine creative capabilities and the promotion
of highly innovative research in Europe and the United States (CREA). One of the two major fields of focus of the study is
nanotechnology (The second is human genetics). The project is sponsored by the Newly Emerging Science and Technolo-
gies (NEST) program of the European Union. – Further: The Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State Uni-
versity (CNS-ASU) helps ensure “that advances in nanotechnology bring about improvements in the quality of life for all
Americans” (PL 108-153).  The Center’s vision is that research into the societal aspects of nanoscale science and engi-
neering (NSE), carried out in close collaboration with NSE scientists and combined with public engagement, will improve
deliberation and decision making about NSE.  CNS-ASU builds the capacity to address the societal implications of NSE
by creating a broad institutional network, instituting a coherent research program, promoting innovative educational op-
portunities, and engaging in meaningful participation and outreach activities, especially with under-represented communi-
ties.  Its goal is nothing less than charting a path toward new ways of organizing the production of knowledge and devel-
oping and testing new processes of anticipatory governance to meet the emerging promise and challenges of NSE. – In
addition there are several projects; see the international nanotechnology and society network (www.nanoandsociety.
com/). – See also the European Nanotechnology Gateway: www.nanoforum.org/
6 Mittelstraß (1987, 152) stresses: “Interdisciplinarity always changes the disciplinarity pattern, the methods and ap-
proaches. There exists an eminent feedback and impact on disciplinarity”.
7 Some philosophical traditions will argue for one basic understanding and a particular core content, for instance an ap-
proach from the perspective of the scientific realism. But I will not presuppose such a position; rather I will look at the
various approaches.
8 In other words: “All interdisciplinary activities are rooted in the ideas of unity and synthesis, evoking a common episte-
mology of convergence.” (Klein 1990, 11)
9 However, beside unity there were various other elements such as problem-orientation and –resolution that have to be
regarded as motivational elements of interdisciplinarity.
10 Here we see that interdisciplinary objects are related to a position in philosophy that is called „neural onotology“.
11 Ontological reductionism is known as the stance stating that the world consists (totally) of atoms or other fundamental
material entities (“materialism”) or, on the contrary, of mental entities (“idealism”).
12 This position might be called “real-constructivism” or “materialistic constructivism”.
13 This is the classical “cognitive constructivism” or “idealistic constructivism”.
14 They do not exist since the beginning of the world. It might be disputed whether these objects are by themselves “inter-
disciplinary” or, on the contrary, whether they are just perceived, described, or shaped under an interdisciplinary perspec-
tive. Although it might be controversial whether a particular object is evidently labeled “interdisciplinary” – for instance,
a technical object may be seen as a disciplinary object of engineering sciences or as an interdisciplinary object, and it
should not be doubted that these are the same objects –  interdisciplinary objects seem to exist at least for a certain time.
And, the future development of science may shift these objects to domains of new unified disciplines or, similarly, it may
be shown that they belong to fields of classical, already-existing disciplines. So the ontological boundaries become time
dependent—and also minimal dependent on our abilities, our knowledge, and our technological skills.
15 This holds although, f.i., the “new experientalism” has broadly argued in favor of it. This position traces back to Francis
Bacon in the early 17th century. Also some aspects can be found in the pragmatist tradition. Today Hacking (1996), Latour
and Woolgar (1979) argue for this position: Here, a severe debate between Latour (“realcontructivism”) and the Edin-
burgh School of Constructivism (“social constructivism” , David Bloor et al.).
16 Further: Erich Jantsch (1980) views self organization theory as a unification approach with multidimensional “scientific
and human implications”. Klaus Mainzer (1996) identifies within the complex systems theory “the basic principles of a
common systems science in the 21st century, overcoming traditional boundaries between natural, cognitive, and social
sciences, mathematics, humanities and philosophy.”
17 It addresses old questions of the emergence of new phenomena, of new properties, patterns, entities, and qualities. One
important lesson of complex systems theory for all sciences is the fundamental role of instability in nature, technology and
even in social processes.
18 In other branches it is clear that hermeneutics is not reducible to empirical measurement and quantitative objectivity;
empirical measurement and data analysis methodologies are not reducible to hermeneutics.
19 “Nature”, the protagonists of Bionics are concerned, “reaches its goals efficiently and economically, with a minimum of
available energy and resources. The experience available in Nature can be applied to conduct technological research and
development.” (Hill 1998)
20 Construction and reconstruction, intervention and representation, here: technology/engineering science and biology are
merged, at least to some degree. Bionics not only aims to produce knowledge but to produce technical artifacts. Analogies
play an important methodological role. So, bionics turns out to be an outstanding paradigm of a technoscience that is
based on a transfer method across the border or trading zone (Galison 1996) between biology and engineering.
21 For course, social scientists have mainly focused on this point-but neglected other, more “internal” elements. – Until
now it is unclear what the basic criteria are to specify anything as a “problem”. The term “problem” remains an unspeci-
fied label. A “philosophy of problems” has not been developed until now. However, regarding “interdisciplinarity” a
demarcation is assumed to exist. “Interdisciplinarity” considers that their problems are science-external, societal pressing,
and policy relevant. Obviously, sciences (= societal-external = sciences-internal) are regarded from the perspective of
society (= science-external = societal-internal). See Cozzens/Gieryn (1990).
22 Usually a distinction is presupposed between science-internal and science-external problems; this traces back to heated
debates in the philosophy of science on internalism and externalism (cp. Böhme et al. 1974).
23 However, in addition, the motives could also be very strict driven from industry and economy. “Real world” economic
problems do not fit in the historically grown functional differentiation and separation of academic disciplines. Often,
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disciplinary knowledge cannot be applied to the pursuit of economic goals; its utility for the “real economic world” is very
limited. Economic “practices” and “applications” are regarded as being themselves “interdisciplinary”,
24 This question should not be addressed here. F.i. realists argue generally in favor of interdisciplinarity from another
perspective than rationalists, methodological constructivist, pragmatists or utilitarists.
25 In addition, when emphasizing “the mathematics of complex systems” (Roco/Bainbridge 2002, x) the NBIC-advocates
should be aware that this theory is developed in the framework of mathematical physics in the last 40 years, and it traces
back to Hénri Poincaré and George David Birkhoff. Complex systems theory is based on deterministic equations that are
hardly applied to individual action, social behavior and political decision making. Such an approach would provide an
“unified cause-and-effect understanding of the physical world from the nanoscale to the planetary scale.”
(Roco/Bainbridge 2002, x) However, complex systems theory might be applied to what has to be considered as the tech-
noscientific core of the NBIC-scenario: the technologies themselves and engineering technosciences in particular. Such an
application is neither new nor unique; history is full of examples. By this, I do not follow George Khushf who identifies a
system theoretic thinking by the NBIC-visionaries (Khushf 2004). Now, besides complex systems theory it is hard to
identify any other interdisciplinary theory or concept that might fit to “Convergence Technologies”.
26 Not everything that is realconstructed is supposed to be interdisciplinary. Classical objects like a machine tool is located
in the domain of mechanical engineering.
27 If the NBIC-scenario would be more broad, f.i. cognitive sciences are not just regarded as natural (cognitive) sciences
with cause-and-effect-explanations and the controlling aim, then we would have to include the mind-brain-object. This
object is a perfect example of a universal object-interdisciplinarity. However, the NBIC-advocates do not seem to go that
far.
28 If we go further, we may add that it is doubtful whether we can find a meaningful understanding of interdisciplinarity in
the NBIC-scenario. The NBIC-advocates eliminate the tension between reductionism and anti-reductionism that is essen-
tial for a meaningful understanding of interdisciplinarity. They mainly argue in favor of a technoscientific reductionism
which is based on the metaphysical understanding of a unity of Nature
29 After closing our discussion we should also stress: in the frame of the NBIC-scenario there could also be elements of
organizational forms of interdisciplinarity. But this is not what was intended by the NBIC-advocates, because, according
to them interdisciplinarity “means more than simply coordination of projects and groups talking to one another along the
way.” (Roco/Bainbridge 2002, 32)
30 And, Immanuel Kant linked the manipulation and construction of nature on the one hand with understanding on the
other hand: We understand nature only as far as we can constitute and construct her! (Kant 1989, 25f)
31 Representing and intervening are, as stated by Hacking, twin sisters (Hacking 1996). Science and modern technology
have always been merged as technosciences (see: Latour 1987; Haraway 1995; Nordmann 2004). The more one knows
about nature in the scope of a science-based reductionist methodology, the more effectively one can act, intervene, and
manipulate.
32 But, it remains a political issue whether we should accept the dissolution of our cultural distinctions. Normative and
ethical questions continue to emerge within this new type of knowledge politics such as NBIC-politics (similar: nature-
politics, bio-politics) which should be critically taken into account ...
33 The European Commission drew attention to CTs in the middle of 2003 issue of the Foresighting Europe newsletter. It
featured a report about two NBIC conferences in the US that considered Converging Technologies for the Improvement of
Human Performance. The newsletter’s editorial continued:  “In order to deal with the questions developed in the US
NBIC report, the Commission envisages the establishment of a high level expert group on Converging Technologies.”
34 The report says further: “CTs converge on common goals or shared visions, and first among the opportunities and chal-
lenges is the formulation of such goals.“ (Nordmann et al. 2004, 4)
35 In addition: „(8.) A permanent societal observatory should be established for real-time monitoring and assessment of
international CT research, including CTEKS. (9.) That the Commission implement a “EuroSpecs” research process for the
development of European design specifications for converging technologies, dealing with normative issues in preparation
of an international “code of good conduct.” (10.) The integration of social research into CT development should be pro-
moted through Begleitforschung (“accompanying research” alongside science and technology R&D).“ (Nordmann et al.
2004, 5)
36 And, we might add another question, Is it still reasonable to continue talking about “interdisciplinarity” with regard to
(techno-) objects?
